Publications – Ruth Byrne

Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual Thought. Annual Review of Psychology. 67:135–57

Juhos, C., Quelhas, A.C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2015). Reasoning about intentions: Counterexamples to reasons for actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition. 41, 1, 55-76.

Gubbins, E., & Byrne, R. M. (2014). Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas. Thinking & Reasoning. 20 (2), 245-268.

Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). The Compatibility Heuristic in Non-Categorical Hypothetical Reasoning: Inferences Between Conditionals And Disjunctions. Cognitive Psychology. 67, 3, 98-129.

Murray, M.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). Cognitive Change in Insight Problem-Solving: Initial Model Errors and Counterexamples. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 25, 2, 210-219.

Frosch, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Causal conditionals and counterfactuals. Acta Psychologica. 141 , (1 ), 54 – 66

Pereda, A., Garavan, H. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Switching attention incurs a cost for counterfactual conditional inferences. Irish Journal of Psychology. 33, (2-3), 72 – 77

Egan, S. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises. Experimental Psychology. 59, (4), 227 – 235

Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Lotstein, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). The consistency of disjunctive assertions. Memory and Cognition, 40, 769-778.

Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). It is not the case that if you understand a conditional you know how to negate it. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 24,3,329-334.

Dixon, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2011) Counterfactual thinking about exceptional actions.Memory & Cognition. 39 (7) 1317-1331.

Pighin, S, Byrne, R.M.J., Ferrante, D., Gonzalez, M. & Girotto, V. (2011). Counterfactual thoughts about experienced, observed, and narrated events. Thinking and Reasoning, 17 (2) 197-211.54.

Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Models Redux. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 14, 6.

McCloy, R.A., Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Understanding cumulative risk. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 63, 499-515

Egan, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals. Acta Psychologica. 132, (3), 240-249

Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2009). ‘If’ and the problems of conditional reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 13, 282-287

Espino, O., Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). People think about what is true for conditionals, not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of     ‘if’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1072-1078

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Girotto, V. (2009) The mental model theory of conditionals. Topoi– An International Review of Philosophy, 28(1), 75-80.

Moreno-Rios, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2008). Semifactual ‘even if’ reasoning, Acta Psychologica, 128, 197 – 209

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). Precis of The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 439 – 453

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The rational imagination and other possibilities: Author’s response, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 470 – 480

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The effects of reasons for acting on counterfactual thinking., Thinking and Reasoning, 13, 461 – 483

McEleney, A. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts. Thinking and Reasoning. 12, 235-255

Santamaria, C., Espino, O. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Counterfactual and semifactual conditionals prime alternative possibilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 31, 1149 – 1154

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2004). Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order effect. Memory & Cognition, 32, 369-378.

Byrne, R.M.J. & Egan, S.M. (2004). Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 113-120

Quelhas, A. C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2003). Reasoning with deontic and counterfactual conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning, 9, 43 -66.

Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, 405-445.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning,

pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review. 109, 646-678.

Segura, S. Fernandez-Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Temporal and causal order effects

in counterfactual thinking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 55, 1295-1305.

Thompson, V. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Reasoning Counterfactually: Making inferences about things that didn’t happen. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,and Cognition. 28, 1154-1170.

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Semifactual “Even If” Thinking. Thinking & Reasoning,

Byrne, R.M.J. & McEleney, A. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1318- 1331.

Byrne, R.M.J., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P. (2000) The temporality effect

in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Memory & Cognition, 28, 264-    281.

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about controllable actions.

Memory & Cognition, 28, 1071-1078.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Mental models and pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 284-285.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1999). Models rule ok? A reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines, 9, 111-118.<

Byrne, R.M.J. & Tasso, A. (1999). Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition. 27, 726-740.

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1999). Counterexamples and the suppression of

inferences. Journal of Memory & Language, 40, 347-373.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Spatial mental models in counterfactual thinking about what might have

been. Kognitionswissenschaft,   7, 19-26.

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1998). Context suppresses inferences. Analise

Psicologica , 210-214.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Advances in Research and Theory. Vol 37. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 105-154.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1997). Reasoning strategies for suppositional

deductions. Cognition,  62, 1-49.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Mental models and syllogisms. Behavioral and

Brain Sciences, 19, 543 – 546.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1995). A model point of view. Thinking and Reasoning,  

1, 339-350.

Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S.J., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1995). Reasoning with suppositions.

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 48A, 915-944.

Schaeken, W., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., d’Ydewalle, G. (1995). A comparison of

conditional and disjunctive inferences: a case study of the mental model theory of reasoning. Psychologica Belgica. 35, 57-70.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Models, necessity, and the search for

counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 775-777.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1994). Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: a reply to Bonatti, and to O’Brien, Braine, and Yang. Psychological Review, 101, 734-739.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Mental models or formal rules? Behavioral and

Brain Sciences, 16, 368-380.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Precis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain

 Sciences, 16, 323-333.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1992). Reasoning Strategies. Irish Journal of Psychology:

Trinity 400 Special Issue, 13, 111-124.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). The spontaneous use of propositional connectives. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 45A, 89-110.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and

Over. Cognition. 43, 173-182.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1992). Propositional reasoning by model. Psychological Review, 99, 418-439.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1992). In defense of reasoning: A reply to

Greene. Psychological Review, 99, 188-190.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Can valid inferences be suppressed? Cognition, 39, 71-78.

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Modelos mentales en el razonamiento deductivo. Revista de Occidente, 119, 85-111. Trans F. Torres Oliver.

 

Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Meta-logical problems: knights, knaves, and Rips.

Cognition, 36, 69-84.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1989). Spatial reasoning.Journal of Memory and

Language, 28, 564-575.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Only reasoning.Journal of Memory and

Language, 28, 313-330.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: the case of

multiple quantification. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Human deductive reasoning. Cognitive Science: Special Issue of the Irish

Journal of Psychology, 10, 216-231.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Everyday reasoning with conditional sequences. Quarterly Journal of

Experimental Psychology, 41A, 141-166.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31,61-83.