Publications

 2016

Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual Thought. Annual Review of Psychology. 67, 135–57 pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual thinking. In A. Kind (ed). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. Pp.339-352.

2015

Juhos, C., Quelhas, A.C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2015). Reasoning about intentions:          Counterexamples to reasons for actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,  Memory & Cognition. 41, 1, 55-76. pdf

Byrne, R. M.J. (2015). Mental models. In R. Scott & S. Kosslyn(Eds). Emerging Trends in the      Social and Behavioral Sciences. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 1-13.

2014

Gubbins, E., & Byrne, R. M. (2014). Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments  about  moral dilemmas. Thinking & Reasoning. 20 (2), 245-268.pdf

2013

Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). The Compatibility Heuristic in Non-Categorical Hypothetical Reasoning: Inferences Between Conditionals And Disjunctions. Cognitive Psychology. 67, 3, 98-129. pdf

Murray, M.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). Cognitive Change in Insight Problem-Solving: Initial Model Errors and Counterexamples. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 25, 2, 210-219.pdf

Byrne, R. M.J. (2013). Counterfactual Reasoning. In D.S. Dunn (Ed). Oxford   Bibliographies  in Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nduibuisi, B. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). Intentionality and choice. In M. Knauff, M.,    Pauen, N., Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth (Eds.) Proceedings of the 35th Annual  Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1970-1975). Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society.pdf

Meehan, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). The development of the rational imagination. In        Barouillet, P. & Gauffroy, C. (eds). The Development of Thinking Hove: Psychology Press. Pp. 34-48.

2012

Frosch, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Causal conditionals and counterfactuals. Acta Psychologica. 141 , (1 ), 54 – 66 pdf

Pereda, A., Garavan, H. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Switching attention incurs a cost for          counterfactual conditional inferences. Irish Journal of Psychology. 33, (2-3), 72 – 77 pdf

Egan, S. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises.     Experimental Psychology. 59, (4), 227 – 235 pdf

Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Lotstein, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). The consistency of       disjunctive assertions. Memory and Cognition, 40, 769-778. pdf

Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). It is not the case that if you understand a conditional you know how to negate it. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 24,3,329-334.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J., Carson, R., & Hannigan, B. (2012). Celebrating fifty years of psychology at Trinity College Dublin: A special issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology, 33, 2-3, pp 156.

2011

Dixon, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2011) Counterfactual thinking about exceptional actions. Memory & Cognition. 39 (7) 1317-1331.pdf

Pighin, S, Byrne, R.M.J., Ferrante, D., Gonzalez, M. & Girotto, V. (2011). Counterfactual   thoughts about experienced, observed, and narrated events. Thinking and Reasoning, 17 (2) 197-211.54.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. (2011) Counterfactual and causal thoughts about exceptional events. In   Hoerl, C., McCormack, T., & Beck, E. (eds). Understanding counterfactuals, understanding causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 208-229.

2010

Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Models Redux. Trends in Cognitive  Sciences. 14, 6.pdf

McCloy, R.A., Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Understanding cumulative       risk.    Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 63, 499-515 pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010) Conditional and possibilities. In Oaksford,   M., & Chater, N. (eds), Cognition and conditionals, Oxford University Press. pp 55-68.

2009

Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2009). ‘If’ and the problems of conditional    reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 13, 282-287  pdf

Espino, O., Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). People think about what is true for conditionals, not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of ‘if’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1072-1078  pdf

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Girotto, V. (2009) The mental model theory of conditionals. Topoi– An International Review of Philosophy, 28(1), 75-80. pdf

Egan, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). Indicative and counterfactual ‘only    if’ conditionals. Acta Psychologica. 132, (3), 240-249 pdf

Dixon, J. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2009). If only counterfactuals and the exceptionality effect. In N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (Eds.), Proceedings of the 31th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society  (pp.2860-2865). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. & Girotto, V. (2009). ‘Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking’ In K. Markman, W. Klein & E. Suhr (eds), Handbook of imagination and mental simulation Hove, Psychology Press. Pp. 151-160.

2008

Moreno-Rios, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2008). Semifactual ‘even if’   reasoning, Acta Psychologica, 128, 197 – 209 pdf

2007

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). Precis of The Rational Imagination: How People Create        Alternatives to Reality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 439 – 453 pdf

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The rational imagination and other possibilities: Author’s response, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 470 – 480 pdf

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The effects of reasons for acting on counterfactual     thinking., Thinking and Reasoning, 13, 461 – 483 pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. (2007). Whether, although and other conditional connectives’ in, editor(s)    W. Schaeken, Vandierendonck, A., Schroyens, W., and d’Ydewalle, G. , The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions, Mahwah: New Jersey, Lawrence    Erlbaum Associates, pp53 – 62.

2006

McEleney, A. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts.Thinking and Reasoning. 12, 235-255 pdf

Egan, S.E. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Counterfactual promises and threats. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science  Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum pp.   1257-1262.pdf

2005

Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality.Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press. pp 254.

Santamaria, C., Espino, O. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Counterfactual and semifactual conditionals prime alternative possibilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 31, 1149 – 1154 pdf

Cowley, M. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). When Falsification is the Only Path to Truth. In B. G.    Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual     Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 512-517. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pdf

Meehan, J.E. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Children’s counterfactual thinking: The temporal order effect. In B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Bucciarelli (Eds.), Proceedings of the 27th    Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum   Associates pp. 1467-1473. pdf

Murray, M.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Attention and working memory in insight problem solving. In B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty-   Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. p.1571-  1576. Mahwah,    NJ: Erlbaum. pdf

Walsh, C.R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). The mental representation of what might have been.  In D. R. Mandel, D. J. Hilton, & P. Catellani (Eds.) The psychology of counterfactual thinking. London : Routledge.

Byrne, R. M. J. & Walsh C.R. (2005). Resolving Contradictions. In V. Girotto & P.N.   Johnson-Laird, (Eds.). The shape of reason: essays in honour of Paolo Legrenzi. Hove:   Psychology Press.

2004

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2004). Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order effect.Memory & Cognition, 32, 369-378. pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. & Egan, S.M. (2004). Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 113-120 pdf

Cowley, M., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2004). Chess Masters’ Hypothesis Testing. In K. D.Forbus, D.  Gentner, & T. Rogers (Eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty- Sixth Annual Conference of the  Cognitive Science Society. pp. 250- 255. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pdf

2003

Quelhas, A. C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2003). Reasoning with deontic and counterfactual conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning, 9, 43 -66. pdf

2002

Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, 405-445. pdf

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review. 109, 646-678. pdf

Segura, S. Fernandez-Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Temporal and causal order effects in counterfactual thinking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 55, 1295-1305. pdf

Thompson, V. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Reasoning Counterfactually: Making inferences   about  things that didn’t happen. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 28, 1154-1170.pdf

McCloy R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Semifactual “even if” thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 8, 41-67. pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. & Walsh, C.R. (2002). Contradictions and counterfactuals: Generating belief revisions in conditional inference. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.pdf

2001

Walsh, C.R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2001). A computational model of counterfactual thinking: The temporal order effect. In J.D. Moore & K. Stenning (Eds.) Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 1078 – 1083. pdf

Espino, O. Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2001). Supresion de inferencias en condicionales.    In Fernandez Berrocal, P. and Santamaria, C. (Eds). Manual practico de psicologia del pensamiento. (Pp. 37-49). Barcelona: Ariel.

2000

Byrne, R.M.J. & McEleney, A. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1318- 1331.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P. (2000) The temporality effect in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Memory & Cognition, 28, 264-    281.pdf

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about controllable actions.Memory & Cognition, 28, 1071-1078.pdf

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Mental models and pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 284-285.

Byrne, R.M.J., and McEleney, A. (2000). Effetto dell’azione nel pensiero controfattuale: una teoria basata sui modelli mentali. In Cherubini, P., Giaretta, Pierdaniele, Mazzocco, A.  (Eds). Ragionamento: Psicologia e logica. (pp 283-291.) Firenze: Giunti.

McEleney, A. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking and causal explanation. In García-Madruga, J., Carriedo, N. & González-Labra, M. J.. Mental Models in Reasoning. (pp. 301-314). Madrid: UNED.

Quelhas, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Latencies to understand and reasoning from counterfactual conditionals. In J. A. Garcia Madruga (Ed). Mental models and reasoning. (pp 315-326). Madrid: UNED.

Segura, S., Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Temporal and causal relations in    counterfactual thinking. In J. A. Garcia Madruga (Ed). Mental models and reasoning. . (pp 327-336) Madrid: UNED

1999

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1999). Models rule ok? A reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines, 9, 111-118.

Byrne, R.M.J. & Tasso, A. (1999). Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and             counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition. 27, 726-740.

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1999). Counterexamples and the suppression of  inferences. Journal of Memory & Language, 40, 347-373.

McEleney, A. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1999). Consequences of counterfactual reasoning and causal reasoning. In Bagnara, S. (Ed.), European Conference on Cognitive Science ’99 (pp. 199-205). Siena, Italy:University of Siena.

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1999). Counterexample availability. In W.      Schaeken, G. De Vooght, A. Vandierendonck & G. d’Ydewalle (Eds.). Deductive reasoning    and strategies Hillsdale: Erlbaum. p. 97-110.

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1999). Thinking about what might have been: if only, even if, causality and emotions. In N. Hahn & S.C. Stoness (Eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

McEleney, A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Counterfactual thinking and causal explanation. In J.Dunnion, G. O’Hare, S. O’Nuaillain, R. Reilly & B. Smyth (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’98. London: Springer-Verlag.

Byrne, R. M., & Quelhas, A. C. (1999). Raciocínio contrafactual e modelos mentais. Análise Psicológica, 4, 713-721. pdf

1998

Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Spatial mental models in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Kognitionswissenschaft,   7, 19-26.

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1998). Context suppresses inferences. Analise Psicologica , 210-214.

McCloy, R.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Thinking about what might have been different and what might have been the same. In J. Dunnion, G. O’Hare, S. O’Nuaillain, R. Reilly & B. Smyth (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’98. London: Springer-Verlag.

Byrne, R.M.J., Tasso, A. and Thompson, V. (1998). Cognitive processes in Counterfactual Conditionals. In K. Korta, E. Sosa and X. Arrazola (Eds.) Cognition, Agency, and Rationality: Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. Nertherlands: Kluwer. pp 113-129.

Segura, S., Fernandez-Berrocal, P., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1998). Razonamiento contrafactual: la posición serial y el número de antecedentes en los pensamientos sobre lo que podría haber sido. In D. Valiña, & M. J. Blanco (Eds.), I Jornadas de Psicologia del Pensamiento (pp. 179-187). Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela.

1997

Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking about what might have     been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Advances in Research and Theory. Vol    37. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 105-154.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1997). Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions. Cognition,  62, 1-49.

Byrne, R.M.J., and McEleney, A. (1997). Cognitive processes in regret for actions and       inactions. In M. Shafto & P. Langley (Eds.) Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of  the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum. pp 73-78.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). The coming of age of the psychology of thinking and reasoning. In R.Fuller, P. Noonan Walsh, & P. McGinley. (Eds). A Century of Psychology. London: Routledge. pp. 207-223.

1996

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Mental models and syllogisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 543 – 546.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Towards a model theory of imaginary thinking. In J. Oakhill and A.Garnham (Eds.) Mental Models in Cognitive Science: Essays in honour of Phil Johnson-Laird. Hove, UK: Erlbaum, Taylor & Francis. pp. 155-174.

1995

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1995). A model point of view. Thinking and Reasoning,  1, 339-350.

Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S.J., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1995). Reasoning with suppositions.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 48A, 915-944.

Schaeken, W., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., d’Ydewalle, G. (1995). A comparison of conditional and disjunctive inferences: a case study of the mental model theory of reasoning. Psychologica Belgica. 35, 57-70.

Byrne, R.M.J., Culhane, R., and Tasso, A. (1995). The temporality effect in thinking about what might have been. In J.D. Moore and J.F. Lehman (Eds.) Proceedings of the 17th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum.pp. 385-390.

1994

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 775-777.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1994). Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: a reply to Bonatti, and to O’Brien, Braine, and Yang. Psychological Review, 101, 734-739.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Deductive reasoning. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.) Encyclopedia of  Intelligence.New York: MacMillan.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Tasso, A. (1994). Counterfactual Reasoning: Inferences from hypothetical conditionals. In Ram, A. and Eiselt, K. (Eds). Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum. pp. 124-129.

Keane, M.T., Cunningham, P., Brady, M. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). AICS’94. Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. Dublin: Dublin University Press. pp 246.

1993

Evans, J.St.B.T., Newstead, S. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction. Hove, UK, and Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp 310.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Mental models or formal rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 368-380.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Precis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 323-333.

Byrne, R.M.J., and Handley, S. (1993). The nature and development of meta-deductive   reasoning strategies. In K. Ryan and R.F.E. Sutcliffe (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’92. London: Springer-Verlag. pp. 59-70.

Byrne, R.M.J., Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Handley, S. (1993). Who’s telling the truth…Cognitive processes in meta-deductions. In H. Sorenson (Ed). AI and Cognitive Science ’91. London: Springer-Verlag, pp. 221-233.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Models and deductive rationality. In Manktelow,K.I. and Over, D.E. (Eds.) Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives.London: Routledge. pps. 177-210.

1992

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1992). Reasoning Strategies. Irish Journal of Psychology:Trinity 400 Special Issue, 13, 111-124.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). The spontaneous use of propositional       connectives. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 45A, 89-110.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition. 43, 173-182.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1992). Propositional reasoning by   model. Psychological Review, 99, 418-439.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1992). In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene. Psychological Review, 99, 188-190.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). The model theory of deduction. In Rogers, Y, Rutherford, A. and Bibby, P.(Eds.) Models in the Mind: Theory, Perspective, and Applications. London: Academic Press. pp. 11 – 28.

Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). Advances in the Psychology of Reasoning: Meta-deduction. In Keane, M. T. and Gilhooly, K. (Eds.) Advances in the Psychology of Thinking, Vol. 1. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 127-145.

1991

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK, and Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp 243.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Can valid inferences be suppressed? Cognition, 39, 71-78.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Modelos mentales en el razonamiento     deductivo. Revista de Occidente, 119, 85-111. Trans F. Torres Oliver.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). The construction of explanations.   In McTear, M.and Creaney, N. (Eds.) AI and Cognitive Science ’90. London: Springer-Verlag.

1990

Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Meta-logical problems: knights, knaves, and Rips. Cognition, 36, 69-84.

Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Mental models. In Eysenck, M. (Ed.) Dictionary of Cognitive Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1990). Models and deductive reasoning. In Gilhooly, K.J., Keane, M.T.G, Logie, R.H., & Erdos, G. (Eds.) Lines of Thinking: Reflections on the Psychology of Thought. Volume 1: Representation, Reasoning, Analogy, and Decision Making. pp. 139-152. London: Wiley.

Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1990). Remembering conclusions we have inferred: what biases reveal. In J.-P. Caverni, J.-M. Fabre, & M. Gonzalez (Eds.) Cognitive Biases: Their Contribution for Understanding Human Cognitive Processes. pp. 109-120. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Mental models. In H. Yoshikawa and T. Holden (Eds.) Proceedings of the IFIP WG 5.2 Second Workshop on CAD.pp. 3 – 15. CAD, Cambridge.

1989

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31,61-83.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Everyday reasoning with conditional sequences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41A, 141-166.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1989). Spatial reasoning.Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 564-575.pdf

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Human deductive reasoning. Cognitive Science: Special Issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology, 10, 216-231.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Keane, M.T.G. (1989). Cognitive Science: A Special Issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology. Dublin: Psychological Society of Ireland. pp 352.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Only   reasoning.Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 313-330. pdf

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: the case of multiple quantification. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673.pdf

 

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